another_jim wrote:{start OT}
I think the older Wittgenstein was wrong as often as the young one. ...snip... In essence, he went from being an eggist to being a chickenist in things linguistic.
{end OT}
snip...
So the productive argument is not about standards versus no standards, but about which (or whose) standards. For coffee, I'm recommending a standard based on skill and effort all along the supply chain. But I'd be happy if people used any standard of their choosing as consistently and clearly as possible rather than just reporting their raw likes and dislikes.
Standards are only useful if they help me make choices in the world but they don't substitute for preferences. People's preferences are still interesting, often enough they point outside of the conventional wisdom (there are examples on this site). I don't want to have to like a coffee because its made well. I don't want to have to like a coffee because it conforms with someone's idea of skilled production. I'm happy for different groups of people to like coffee for entirely different sets of reasons. I don't feel obliged to believe someone when they say that they like stale coffee, there might be a whole sub-population of people who do, and that is fine with me and worth thinking about. I don't NEED their preference to be measurable in a scientific manner to accept that it points at something.
The less OT and more interesting thing in this context about the later Wittgenstein is his acknowledgment that language does not encode objective meaning, that what we mean is negotiated as we speak. The transition from his need for objective meaning to a contingent one is what I was referring to.



